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Poverty-Sensitive Scorecards to 
Prioritize Lending and Grant Allocation 
with an Application in Central America 
Manuel A. Hernandez1 and Máximo Torero2 
1 Introduction 
The importance of credit access in improving economic opportunities in develop-
ing markets is well established and generally recognized by policymakers. The 
optimal use of loan funds, however, could be subject to a potential tradeoff be-
tween sustainability and poverty reduction. This chapter develops a poverty-
sensitive scorecard system for lending or grant allocation in underdeveloped mar-
kets. The methodology is innovative in that it combines both a risk and a poverty 
scorecard. This ensures that the loan or grant allocation is not only focused on tar-
geting the poor, but also on ensuring the sustainability of the investment project. 
In addition, the risk scoring uses an innovative non-linear and nonparametric 
model that leads to better assessment of credit worthiness and results in a lower 
screening of the poor from this extremely important market. We then implement 
the scorecard system using a real example of grant competition in Central America 
to link rural smallholders to markets. 
The importance of credit in improving economic opportunities in developing 
markets is well documented (Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch 2005; Shahidur, 
2006; Brett, 2006, Gosh, Mookherjee and Ray, 2000). Similarly, the role of micro- 
and small enterprises in economic development has been recognized by policy-
makers since the 1970s when the overwhelming patronage of large-scale indus-
tries did not bring redistribution with growth (McPherson, 1996). Promotion of 
small enterprises requires a leveling of the playing field between the large-scale 
sector and the small-scale sector. One way to do so is to design policies that do not 
explicitly or implicitly discriminate against the small-scale sector. Policies that 
assist small enterprises may also be desirable. Measures to assist small enterprises 
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have included training in production and marketing methods, as well as measures 
to make credit available to them.3 Apart from priority and subsidized lending, fi-
nancial assistance can be provided by donors in the form of grants. 
In lending or extending grants to small enterprises, the choice of projects 
among competing demanders is important. In underdeveloped markets where con-
tracts are difficult to enforce and the problem of adverse selection (wrong choices 
made when the type of borrower is unknown) is severe, lending risks are high. 
Traditionally, credit in these sectors has been characterized by money lenders of-
fering loans with relatively high interest rates. The credit from government banks 
to the majority of poor borrowers has been restricted due to stringent collateral 
demands. One form in which formal credit to the poor has expanded is through 
microfinance. This type of lending is targeted to self-employment activities with-
out accompanying collateral. It is well known that the absence of collaterals can 
lead to credit market failure (Ghatak, and W. Guinnane, 1999) when a loan is 
granted to individuals rather than groups. 
Most of microfinance credit is extended based on the reputation of the borrower 
(for example his/her past borrowing and repayment pattern). As reputation is diffi-
cult to measure, the lack of a more precise measure of borrower’s riskiness affects 
the efficiency of the credit market. Thus, in spite of the well-publicized success 
stories in microfinance credit, there have been concerns that the lending institu-
tions have been able to sustain low rates of interest and relatively high default 
rates mainly due to subsidies and soft loans. For example, Grameen Bank charges 
an average real rate of 10 percent, and has experienced losses close to 18 percent 
of outstanding loans over the period 1985–1996 if proper adjustment for the port-
folio size is taken into account (Armendaris de Aghion and Morduch, 2005). 
Banks face greater difficulty in overcoming adverse selection problems in indi-
vidual lending. A credit scorecard that predicts credit worthiness of the borrower 
accurately can address the problem of market failure to a large extent. With a 
credit score, lending institutions will also be able to offer a menu of choices com-
bining interest rates and approved loan amount for a potential borrower. The fun-
damental element in producing such a menu is the creation of an accurate risk 
ranking (hitherto missing in case of most lending to the poor including in microfi-
nance credit) for individual borrower units based on some specific attributes. 
Credit scoring models have been shown to be the most effective tool in determin-
ing the riskiness of a borrower and are usually based on long historical data in-
volving several entities (for example, an integrated system of lending institutions). 
However, the riskiness of a borrower (in terms of the chance of default on re-
payment for loans and in terms of the efficient and adequate use of funds for 
grants) is not the only criterion that should be used in the case of development 
                                                          
3 The vast majority of these credit programs, especially the so-called “agricultural devel-
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lending. The menu of projects should also be assessed in terms of their potential 
for reducing poverty. Consequently, the optimal use of loan funds could be subject 
to a potential tradeoff between sustainability and poverty reduction. 
This chapter develops a poverty-sensitive scorecard system for lending or grant 
allocation in underdeveloped markets, which addresses the question of how to 
lend or provide grants when faced with the above-mentioned tradeoff. The pro-
posed methodology consists of two stages. The first accounts for the development 
of a risk scorecard – a risk score – for potential borrowers using the latest devel-
opments in econometric modeling. The nonparametric technique we propose will 
allow risk ranking through credit scores that significantly improve upon current 
methods by providing a more accurate measure of risk associated with individual 
loans, and more importantly, provide a more accurate measurement of potential 
gains and losses associated with each loan. In the second stage, following a Prin-
cipal Components approach, a poverty scorecard is developed to evaluate the pro-
jects of potential borrowers who have a risk score below a certain threshold. That 
is, projects that are proven to be sustainable in the first stage are ranked in the sec-
ond stage in terms of their potential impact on poverty reduction. 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the 
proposed risk and poverty scorecards in detail, including the methodology used to 
develop and implement them. In Section 3, we apply the poverty scorecard system 
to a real example of grant competition in Central America to link rural small-
holders to markets. Section 4 provides concluding remarks. 
2 Building a Scorecard 
The scorecard system proposed for lending or grant allocation (extension) in de-
veloping markets consists of two stages. In the first stage, a risk scorecard or algo-
rithm suitable for lending to small enterprises is constructed and applied using the 
latest developments in statistical (econometric) modeling. In the second stage, the 
projects of potential borrowers (beneficiaries) with a risk score below a particular 
threshold are evaluated in terms of their potential impact on poverty reduction 
through a poverty scorecard. The process involving the two stages is summarized 
in Figures 1 and 2. 
The conceptual framework behind the proposed risk and poverty scorecard sys-
tem rests both on targeting the poor and on assuring sustainability of the project. 
With the premise that sustainability is a necessary condition for poverty reduction, 
in stage 1, a loan/grant application is evaluated in terms of the borrower’s default 
probability. Similar to the default likelihood in lending markets, which is usually 
captured through a credit scorecard, a risk score or default probability can be 
computed using information from the loan/grant applications as well as informa-
tion from other sources. 
Note that the interpretation of default differs for a loan and a grant. In the case of 
a loan, default is to be interpreted as an event in which the loan is not repaid in time.  
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Fig. 2. Stage 2: Creating a Poverty Scorecard among Short-Listed Projects 
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In the case of a grant, where there is no repayment obligation, the sustainability of 
the project needs to be assessed in terms of alternative indicators. Thus, in the case 
of loans, a standard credit scorecard framework can be applied, while in the case 
of grants, estimating a survival probability or the probability of returns beyond a 
threshold could be assessed using data from a reference or a comparable group of 
enterprises. 
Information from several sources can then be combined to estimate default 
probability for the loan/grant applications. Some data can be collected in conjunc-
tion with the loan/grant application. However, data regarding transactions of the 
applicant with other institutions, data regarding external factors that can affect the 
profitability/viability of the enterprise/project, and data from comparable enter-
prises are essential for improving the predictive power of the scoring model. After 
selecting those projects with a minimum risk level to assure their sustainability, 
these projects are then evaluated in terms of their potential impact on poverty. 
It is worth noting that the creation of a scorecard system is a dynamic process 
that can be improved over time, particularly when there is initially limited infor-
mation for risk assessment (see Figure 3). An initial risk algorithm can be derived 
based on the performance of comparable enterprises/borrowers. This algorithm 
can then be applied to evaluate the loan/grant applications of interest, using the 
information collected during the application process as well as information from 
other sources. The outcomes of the projects that were selected based on their risk 
score and potential impact on poverty reduction can then be further evaluated, 
which will help to expand and update the data for the scorecard system. Thus, an 
interim scorecard can be created (most likely through a pilot intervention) that not 
only exploits existing information but also incorporates additional incoming in-
formation to improve the scorecard. This process can continue until a performance 
history is established for a reasonably large portfolio of loans/grants. 
Next, we discuss in more detail the methodology used to develop and imple-
ment the risk and poverty scorecards. 
Lenders/Granters  ĺ 
collect data for project 





Update data for 
scorecard creation 
Provide training for 
updating database and 
applying scorecard 
 
Fig. 3. Evaluation of Project and Strengthening of Database and Scorecard 
268 Manuel A. Hernandez and Máximo Torero 
 
2.1 Risk Scorecard 
In well-developed credit markets, the use of credit scores is an integral part of the 
lending process. The increase in the use of credit scoring systems in developing 
economies, in contrast, is a relatively recent phenomenon. We intend to develop a 
credit scoring system for lending or extending grants to small enterprises that em-
ploys the latest developments in statistical (econometric) modeling, which are 
likely to improve the accuracy of risk ranking compared to existing methods. In 
particular, our objective is to develop a credit scoring algorithm suitable for lend-
ing to small and micro-enterprises and to provide the guidelines needed to gener-
ate a working database on credit scores based on available data and on potential 
data that can be collected in the future to improve the model prediction. It is also 
our intention to make the credit scoring mechanism simple to apply. 
The development of a robust system of risk scoring will benefit both the 
lender/granter and the borrowers. The absence of a well-developed risk scoring 
system not only restricts access to credit but also prevents the development of dif-
ferentiated borrowing options. Given a credit score, lending institutions are able to 
offer a menu of choices combining interest rates and (pre-approved) loan amounts 
for a potential borrower.4 The fundamental element in producing such a menu is 
the creation of an accurate risk ranking (which has been missing until now in the 
case of most lending to micro- and small enterprises), but the accuracy of this 
ranking mainly depends on the statistical model used to construct it. We propose a 
model that more accurately reflects the relationship between a borrower’s charac-
teristics and risk level. 
As noted above, detailed information regarding both a borrower’s specific 
characteristics and external factors plays a crucial role in building the risk-based 
scorecard. However, in developing countries, detailed information regarding these 
variables is generally not available; thus, loans/grants are sometimes granted by 
qualitative/subjective evaluation. The methodology proposed below is also appli-
cable when there is initially limited information. New information can then be in-
corporated across time to improve the scorecard. 
Methodology 
Associated with every potential borrower, there is a probability of default condi-
tional on the terms of the loan/grant being requested. This probability depends on 
a borrower’s attributes as well as on external factors that are not borrower-specific. 
The main purpose of a scorecard is to create a ranking of borrowers by estimating 
these probabilities, recognizing that their magnitudes depend on several borrower 
attributes and factors. For example, consider a loan request from a small enterprise 
                                                          
4 Risk scoring is not necessarily an instrument used to discriminate against high risk, but an 
important tool in designing the portfolio of borrowing options. Hence, the term of 
loans/grants or the interest rates offered will tend to be sensitive to the type of borrower. 
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closely related to the agricultural sector. The borrower’s characteristics may include 
current assets, income, credit history, and outstanding debt, while external factors 
may include crop price volatility. In general, estimation is conducted by relating a 
discrete (binary) variable to a borrower’s characteristics and to external factors. 
A suitable statistical model (regression) should be an accurate representation of 
the underlying relationship between attributes, external factors, and the defined 
binary variable. The statistical model used belongs to a class of discrete choice 
models in which the odds of a loan being of high (or low) risk is a function of bor-
rower-specific characteristics and other attributes. The specific assumption about 
the functional form for this relationship becomes crucial for classifying the bor-
rowers into risk categories. Depending upon whether the chosen functional form is 
correct or not, the accuracy of the model predictions is likely to vary significantly. 
It is also worth noting that functional assumptions imposed in the development of 
credit scores in developed countries is often of limited use in credit markets in de-
veloping countries, since key variables that affect the riskiness of borrowers, and 
the way in which they affect the level of riskiness, vary significantly between de-
veloped and developing economies.5 It is useful for developing countries to de-
velop a methodology that does not depend on prior knowledge or particular as-
sumptions on functional forms. 
The specific methodological innovation that we propose consists of not assum-
ing a specific functional and distributional form in the relationship between bor-
rowers’ characteristics, external factors, and the default probability. Allowing the 
data to fit in the best functional form is preferable to imposing specific (and most 
likely erroneous) functional and/or distributional assumptions. Statistical models 
in which specific functional forms are not imposed are known as semi-parametric 
and nonparametric estimation methods. Although very well suited for credit scor-
ing research, these methods have surprisingly not been widely applied in this area. 
A plausible explanation for this lies in the fact that most implementable semi-
parametric and nonparametric methods have been recently developed. 
A simple example can illustrate the problem of assuming a specific functional 
form that happens to not be the correct one. Let the default probability of a bor-
rower depend on the loan amount, debt ratio, and asset size. To demonstrate the 
utility of a data-driven method, assume that there exists an unknown threshold as-
set size below which the default probabilities rise exponentially. For asset sizes 
above the threshold level, the default probabilities do not depend on asset size. 
The standard scoring models assume that the odds of default are linear with re-
spect to all explanatory variables and that the underlying distribution governing 
the relationship between the probability of default and the explanatory variables is 
known. The use of these methods will incorrectly estimate the risk of default for 
                                                          
5 For example, it is well established that the loan-to-collateral ratio and payment burden 
are significant contributing factors in risk assessment. However, in agriculture-based 
lending, price volatility and probability of crop failure will play a much bigger role in 
risk ranking. 
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borrowers with asset holdings below the threshold level. This may lead to the po-
tential exclusion of “good” borrowers from the market. 
The specific econometric method that we propose for estimating risk scores is 
the semi-parametric single index model derived by Klein and Spady (1993) be-
cause of its relatively faster and less computational burden estimation process, 
compared to a fully nonparametric method. Recall that we are also looking for a 
method that can be easily implemented. Compared to a parametric method, the 
semi-parametric single index model does not impose a specific distributional form 
when modeling the probability of default. In particular, the probability of default 
is given by,  
( 1 | ) ( | ) ( )P Y X E Y X g X Ec   ,  (1) 
where Y is the binary variable associated with the default of past projects/loans, X 
is the set of socioeconomic and financial characteristics of the borrower, plus 
other factors that could affect the likelihood of default, ( )g   is an unknown func-
tion, and ȕ is the set of parameters to be estimated. This model is semi-parametric 
in nature since the functional form of the linear index is specified, while ( )g   is 
left unspecified. In a parametric setting, ( )g   could be assumed, for example, to 
be a Normal function, which would result in the widely used Probit model. 
Klein and Spady suggest a semi-parametric likelihood approach to obtain pa-
rameters  ȕ  from (1). More specifically, the maximum likelihood estimator of  ȕ  
is given by, 
1
ˆ arg max ( , ) ( ln ( ) (1 ) ln(1 ( )))
n
n i i i i
i
L g y g X y g X
E
E E E E
 
c c    ¦ , (2) 
where ( )g   is approximated for each borrower/applicant i through a leave-one-out 






























 . (3) 
The risk score estimated for each potential borrower or grantee i is, then, the esti-
mated ˆ ig using ȕˆ.
6 
                                                          
6 Single index models also require two identification conditions under which the un-
known parameter vector ȕ and the unknown function g(·) can be sensibly estimated. 
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Steps to Construct a Risk Scorecard 
Given a pool of potential borrowers or grantees, the steps to derive a risk score can 
be summarized as follows: 
1. Gather information from past loans (grants) from the same pool of borrow-
ers (grantees) and/or from other comparable sets of loans (grants) from ap-
plicants similar to the pool of borrowers (grantees). The information col-
lected should allow us to determine/identify the performance of those bor-
rowers/grantees (default or sustainability of their project). The information 
should also include (at least) socioeconomic and financial characteristics of 
the applicants. 
2. Estimate the performance of these previous borrowers/grantees as a func-
tion of their socioeconomic and financial characteristics and other related 
factors (if available) using the semi-parametric single index model de-
scribed above. 
3. The resulting estimated vector of parameters ȕˆ from step 2 can, then, be 
used in (3) to derive a risk score for the interested pool of borrowers or 
grantees. We only need to provide the same set of characteristics and fac-
tors used in the estimation of ȕ for the pool of potential borrowers/grantees 
to be evaluated. 
4. Only those projects (borrowers/grantees) with a risk score below a certain 
threshold will then be assessed in terms of their potential impact on poverty. 
Note that this risk scoring mechanism could operate through a simple implement-
able program in open-source software, such as a spreadsheet. The estimated vector 
of parameters ȕˆ from step 2, and the procedure to obtain ˆ ig , described in equa-
tion (3), can be embedded in the program; the user will then only need to provide 
the set of characteristics contained in X for the potential borrower/grantee(s) to be 
evaluated. However, given that there might initially be limited information regard-
ing loans and grants, particularly for small enterprises and/or development pro-
jects, new information can be incorporated across time to improve the scorecard 
system, particularly the precision of the estimated ȕˆ parameters. A pilot stage 
could be a plausible start so that an interim scorecard is built (with limited infor-
mation) and then, based on the evaluated performance of the selected borrow-
ers/grantees or projects, additional information can be subsequently incorporated 
                                                          
First, the set of explanatory variables X must contain at least one continuous variable. 
Second, ȕ cannot be identified without some location and scale restrictions (normaliza-
tions). One popular location-normalization is to not include a constant in X; one popular 
scale-normalization is to assume that the first component of X has a unit coefficient and 
that this first component is a continuous variable. For further details on semi-parametric 
single index models, refer to Li and Racine (2006). 
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to improve the scorecard. This process can continue until a performance history is 
well established for a reasonably large portfolio of loans/grants. 
2.2 Poverty Scorecard 
Conditional on meeting the sustainability cutoff, the final selection of projects re-
quires assessing their poverty reduction potential. There are several indicators of 
the impact on poverty that could be employed. For example, projects/enterprises 
could be assessed in terms of their labor intensity (low-skilled, female labor) or in 
terms of their geographical location (by which those projects located in poorer ar-
eas are expected to have a greater impact on poverty). 
Additionally, the impact of a project is likely to vary from one region to another 
depending upon local conditions and other factors, such as access to external mar-
kets and infrastructure. A project in areas with a high poverty rate and that face in-
frastructure constraints is expected to have a higher impact on the poor than a pro-
ject in an area with fewer poor people and no binding constraints. Using poverty 
maps combined with market access information could be very useful in approximat-
ing a project’s impact on poverty reduction. Maps of market access, defined in terms 
of estimated travel time to roads, markets, and/or cities, would be very helpful for 
sustainability analysis per se, but could also be used for poverty targeting. 
Table 1. List of Potential Variables for the Creation of a Poverty Scorecard 
Variables Criteria for evaluation 
Geographic indicators  
1. Location in poverty 
mapping space 
The project should be executed in places with high 
poverty rates.  
2. Access to markets  
The project should be executed in places with low 
market access, e.g. very low accessibility to a main road 
or major market (city). 
Employment indicators  
3.Labor intensity Number of new jobs generated by the project. 
4. Low-skill labor intensity Percent of low-skill labor in the project. 
5. Female labor intensity Percent of female labor in the project. 
Spillover indicators 
6. Effects on supply chain 
participants 
Total number of direct beneficiaries from the project 
(ratio based on total amount invested).  
7. Other spillover effects 
(indirect effects, provision of 
public good) 
Total number of indirect beneficiaries from the project 
(ratio based on total amount invested).  
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A value chain perspective is also recommended when assessing a project’s pov-
erty impacts since there are possible spillover effects across the supply chain (for 
example, direct and indirect labor effects). The impact on vulnerable populations 
could also be considered (such as impacts on women’s employment and children’s 
education). A list of potential variables that could be included to develop a poverty 
scorecard is presented in Table 1. 
Methodology 
When assessing a project’s potential impact on the poor, complexity can arise in 
terms of weighting the outcomes. It is possible that some enterprises/projects per-
form better in terms of geographical targeting, but do not do well in terms of their 
potential impact on gender. Consequently, we propose the use of the statistical 
method of Principal Components to determine the weights for the different out-
comes (variables) considered. Principal Component analysis is a statistical tech-
nique that creates new variables that are linear combinations of the original vari-
ables. The new variables are referred to as the “principal components” and are un-
correlated (orthogonal) to each other. The number of principal components gener-
ated is equal to the number of original variables. The first principal component 
accounts for most of the variation in the data, the second principal component ac-
counts for most of the variance that has not been accounted for by the first princi-
pal component, and so forth. 
Generally, one or two principal components are needed to account for more 
than half of the variation in the data. As a rule of thumb for project poverty scor-
ing, we suggest using all first principal components necessary to account for at 
least half of the data variation. Recall that each component is a weighted sum of 
the variables considered to measure poverty reduction. Thus, higher values for a 
component denote a higher poverty impact, whereas lower values denote a lower 
poverty impact. 
Steps to Construct a Poverty Scorecard 
Given a set of projects that meet a sustainability threshold, the steps to construct a 
poverty score can be summarized as follows: 
1. Collect all the necessary information from the projects to construct the 
geographic, employment, and spillover indicators (variables) over which 
the projects will be evaluated. 
2. Normalize the indicators by subtracting the mean and dividing by the stan-
dard deviation. 
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4. Calculate the eigenvectors and eigenvalues of the covariance matrix. Let A 
be a n × n matrix. The parameter Ȝ is an eigenvalue of A if there exists a 
non-zero vector v such that Aȣ = Ȝȣ. In that case, vector v is called an ei-
genvector of A corresponding to eigenvalue Ȝ. We can rewrite the condition 
Aȣ = Ȝȣ as (A – Ȝ I) ȣ = 0, where I is the n × n identity matrix. Now, in or-
der for a non-zero vector v to satisfy this equation, A – Ȝ I must not be in-
vertible. That is, the determinant of A – Ȝ I must be equal to zero. We call 
p(Ȝ ) = det (A – Ȝ I) the characteristic polynomial of A. The eigenvalues of A 
are simply the roots of the characteristic polynomial of A. 
5. Choose the necessary first principal components to account for at least half 
of the variation in the data. Typically, either the first principal component 
alone (PC1) or the first two combined (PC1 and PC2) would satisfy this 
condition. 
6. Use the selected principal components in step 5 to rank the projects on the 
poverty dimension. If more than one principal component is selected, the 
sum of the two components should be considered for the ranking. 
3 An Application to a Grant Competition in Central America 
In this section, we apply the scorecard system to a real example of project selec-
tion for grant allocation in Central America to link smallholders to markets. 
3.1 Details of the Program in Central America 
In October 2010, the Unidad Regional de Asistencia Tecnica (RUTA), with the 
technical support of the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), and 
with funds from the Multilateral Investment Fund (MIF) of the Inter American 
Development Bank (IADB) and the Austrian Cooperation in Central America 
(ADA), launched a program on innovations for linking smallholders to markets in 
Central America. The nature of the program is pro-poor, market–oriented, and 
demand-driven, and covers four countries in the region: Guatemala, El Salvador, 
Honduras, and Nicaragua. In particular, the program is oriented to provide funds 
(up to a maximum of 250,000 U.S. dollars) for projects that involve creating or 
improving market opportunities for smallholders in the region, especially in areas 
with high poverty rates. The projects must be conceived by the same farmers’ as-
sociations and/or small enterprises applying for the funds. 
This program also served as a pilot program to implement the risk and poverty 
scorecard system described previously. The application process ended in January 
2011, the month in which the projects were selected. The projects are currently in 
the implementation phase. 
To ensure transparency, the entire application process was done through a 
website specifically created for this pilot program. The applicants had to provide 
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information regarding the association/enterprise applying for the funds, the in-
tended project and its beneficiaries, their credit history (if any), and the project 
budget and execution plan, as well as any other relevant information. The process 
also involved filling out some administrative forms.7 During the launching of the 
program, the selection methodology (i.e. the risk and poverty scorecard system) 
was also explained to the potential applicants.8 Related materials and an explana-
tory video were posted on the website. 
A total of 58 projects were submitted by different farmers’ associations and 
small enterprises across the four countries, out of which 39 were eligible for 
evaluation. The projects that did not qualify were those for which the applicant 
failed to provide all the required information and forms indicated in the program 
guidelines. The amount requested by all 39 projects equaled 7.1 million dollars, 
and a total of 1.7 million dollars was available for grant allocation. 
3.2 Risk Scoring 
The risk scoring for the 39 projects (applicants) was obtained following the same 
steps described in Subsection 2.1. Information from previous loans/grants, includ-
ing performance and characteristics of the borrowers/grantees, was first gathered 
from other comparable small enterprises in Latin America. These data served to es-
timate the parameters of interest using the semi-parametric single index model pro-
posed by Klein and Spady (1993). Finally, the estimated parameters, together with 
the information provided by the 39 applicants, were used to derive their risk scoring. 
A total of ten variables were considered to construct the risk scoring. These 
included the socioeconomic characteristics of both the beneficiaries of the pro-
ject and the association/enterprise applying for the grant. In particular, we ac-
count for average age, gender, education level, and marital status of the benefi-
ciaries and for seniority, number of workers, asset ownership, and financial in-
formation of the applicant. For further details on the variables used, see Table 2. 
The selection of the variables responds to the fact that they are widely used in 
the microcredit literature, as well as to the amount of previous information 
available from the pool of loans/grants from similar enterprises. In the pilot pro-
gram, additional information was naturally collected to validate the information 
reported by the applicants. 
                                                          
7 To apply, applicants had to first register with a username and password. The application 
did not have to be completed all at once. There were also contact persons in each coun-
try for inquiries during the application process. As a proof of their application, once 
submitted, applicants received a PDF file via e-mail summarizing the information they 
reported regarding the association/enterprise, project, and direct beneficiaries (basically 
the information that would then be used to evaluate their application/project). 
8 The only restriction imposed by the donors for this pilot program was that at least one 
project had to be selected from each of the four countries. This was also specified at the 
launching event. 
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Table 2. List of Variables Used for the Creation of the Risk Scorecard 
Characteristics of the direct beneficiaries
from the project 
Business and financial characteristics of 
the association / partnership 
Average age of beneficiaries Seniority of association (years of activity) 
Gender (percentage of men among 
beneficiaries) 
Number of employees / partners in 
association 
Educational level (percentage of 
beneficiaries with secondary or superior 
education) 
Assets (if association owns land or real 
estate) 
Interest rate of most recent loan Marital status (percentage of beneficiaries 
married or in common-law marriages) Term of loan / amount requested 
The results from the estimation of the single index model to derive the parameters 
of interest for the risk scoring are reported in the top panel of Table 3. The sign 
and magnitude of the coefficients should be interpreted with caution, given that 
they are normalized with respect to the first variable in the set of explanatory vari-
ables (in this case, the average age of the beneficiaries). For matters of comparison 
and ease of interpretation (although assuming a specific functional and distribu-
tional form between the likelihood of defaulting and the explanatory variables), in 
the bottom panel of Table 3, we also report the results from a standard Probit 
model. As can be seen, the coefficients generally have the expected sign in the pa-
rametric set-up. For example, asset ownership and a lower loan term decrease the 
probability of default, while older, less educated people and men have a higher 
probability of defaulting, though the coefficients are not always statistically sig-
nificant at a 5 percent level in this parametric model. 
To show the advantages of using a semi-parametric single index model over a 
standard Probit model, Table 4 compares the predictive performance of both models. 
To obtain the predictive performance of each model, the estimated default probabili-
ties (which range between 0 and 1) are first converted to a binary regime prediction 
using the standard 0.5 rule: if the estimated probability is greater than 0.5, the bor-
rower (grantee) is predicted to default, while if the estimated probability is less than 
or equal to 0.5, the borrower is predicted to non-default. The binary (1/0) estimated 
probabilities are then compared to the actual default/non-default behavior of the bor-
rower. It follows that the Probit model has a very poor predictive performance for 
the default cases (28 percent accuracy versus 86 percent for the single index model). 
Overall, the predictive performance of the single index model is 72 percent versus 
48 percent for the Probit model. These results clearly show the advantages of using a 
semi-parametric technique over a parametric method for adequately estimating the 
risk score of a pool of potential borrowers/grantees.  
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Table 3. Modeling the probability of default (dependent variable equal to one if borrower/ 
grantee defaulted, zero otherwise) 
A. Single Index Model 
Variable Coeff Std. Err. 
Characteristics of beneficiaries     
Average age 1.000   
Percent men 0.136 0.024 
Percent with secondary or superior education –0.250 0.032 
Percent married or in common law 0.187 0.025 
Characteristics of association      
Years of activity 0.000 0.001 
Size (number of workers) 0.016 0.006 
If owns land or real state 0.022 0.024 
Amount of loan requested (000 dollars) 0.009 0.002 
Interest rate previous loan ( percent) 0.158 0.019 
Term of loan (months) 0.032 0.003 
Regression type: local constant     
Model type: Klein and Spady     
Continuous kernel type: Gaussian second order     
Bandwidth:    0.119 
# observations   2,899 
B. Probit Model 
Variable Coeff Std. Err. 
Characteristics of beneficiaries     
Average age 0.008 0.004 
Percent men 0.115 0.115 
Percent with secondary or superior education –0.136 0.195 
Percent married or in common law –0.111 0.121 
Characteristics of association      
Years of activity –0.005 0.003 
Size (number of workers) –0.019 0.027 
If owns land or real state –0.284 0.116 
Amount of loan requested (000 dollars) 0.012 0.014 
Interest rate previous loan ( percent) 0.002 0.236 
Term of loan (months) 0.046 0.017 
Constant –0.056 0.966 
# observations   2,899 
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Table 4. Predictive Performance of Single Index Model and Probit model 
Performance indicator Single index model Probit model 
Overall correct default/non-default 
classification  71.8 percent 47.8 percent 
Correct default classification rate 
(sensitivity) 86.2 percent 27.6 percent 
Correct non-default classification rate 
(specificity) 51.9 percent 75.7 percent 
After applying the estimated coefficients to the information provided by the 39 ap-
plicants, we calculated their risk scoring using equation (3). Imposing a cutoff of 67 
percent on the maximum risk score allowed, 24 projects qualified for the second 
stage of the selection process. Please remember that the idea of this first stage in the 
evaluation process is to identify those projects with a low or moderate level of risk 
that also ensures the sustainability of the project. The threshold of 67 percent further 
guaranteed that at least a certain number of projects would get past the risk scoring 


















Risk score Maximum risk  
Fig. 4. Risk Scoring Results 
3.3 Poverty Scoring 
The 24 projects that met the cutoff of 67 percent for the risk scoring were then 
evaluated in terms of their potential poverty impact following the same steps de-
scribed in Subsection 2.2. Seven indicators covering the project’s geographic,  
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Table 5. List of Project Indicators for the Creation of the Poverty Scorecard 
Indicator  Variable 
Geographic indicators  
1. Location in poverty map-
ping space.  
Average poverty rate in area(s) where project will be im-
plemented.  
2. Access to markets  
Average distance, in hours, of area(s) where project will 
be implemented to closest major town with a population 
of 20,000 or above. 
Employment indicators  
3.Labor intensity Total number of new jobs generated by the project. 
4. Low-skill labor intensity Percent of low-skill labor / total labor in the project. 
5. Female labor intensity Percent of female labor / total labor in the project. 
Spillover indicators 
6. Effects on the supply chain Number of direct beneficiaries / total amount invested.  
7. Indirect effects Number of indirect beneficiaries / total amount invested.  
Table 6. Principal Component Analysis: Eigenvalues and Eigenvectors 
A. Eigenvalues  
  PC1 PC2 PC3 PC4 PC5 PC6 PC7 
Eigenvalue 2.22 1.40 1.11 1.05 0.77 0.45 0.00 
Variability (percent) 31.70 19.98 15.84 15.06 10.94 6.47 0.01 
Cumulative percent 31.70 51.68 67.52 82.58 93.51 99.99 100.00 
B. Eigenvectors 
 PC1 PC2 PC3 PC4 PC5 PC6 PC7 
Number of jobs created 0.659 –0.023 –0.169 –0.043 –0.011 0.031 0.730 
Percent Low skilled labor 0.014 0.286 –0.234 0.753 0.543 –0.023 –0.004 
Percent Female labor –0.139 0.580 –0.391 –0.390 0.095 0.574 0.007 
Direct beneficiaries / amount 
invested 0.460 –0.317 0.273 –0.157 0.506 0.431 –0.383 
Indirect beneficiaries / 
Amount invested 0.536 0.184 –0.411 0.042 –0.360 –0.241 –0.566 
Average poverty rate 0.163 0.370 0.584 0.374 –0.450 0.392 –0.002 
Average distance to major 
closest town 0.141 0.557 0.424 –0.334 0.328 –0.521 –0.005 
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employment, and spillover characteristics were considered for the poverty scor-
ing and were built based on the information provided by the applicants. The in-
dicators include the average poverty rate and distance to closest major town of 
the area(s) of project implementation, total number of jobs created, low-skill and 
female-to-total labor ratio, and number of direct and indirect (intended) benefi-
ciaries per dollar invested (see Table 5). As in the case of risk scoring, addi-
tional information was requested in order to validate the information used to 
construct the indicators. 
Poverty scores were then obtained by applying a Principal Component analysis 
over these seven indicators. The corresponding eigenvalues and eigenvectors de-
rived from the analysis are reported in Table 6. Recall that associated with each ei-
genvalue, there is an eigenvector and that the total number of principal components 
generated is equal to the number of variables (indicators) considered for the analysis 
(in this case, seven). For the poverty scoring and subsequent ranking of projects, we 
selected the first two components (CP1 and CP2), given that together they account 
for more than half of the entire variation in the data (52 percent). The first principal 
component (CP1) is highly correlated with the total number of jobs created and the 
number of direct and indirect beneficiaries per dollar invested in the project. The 
second principal component (CP2) is highly correlated with the female-to-total labor 
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Fig. 5. Poverty Scoring Results 
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Figure 5 plots the combined scoring of the 24 projects, where the horizontal axis 
measures the project scoring based on the first principal component and the vertical 
axis measures the project scoring based on the second principal component. Moving 
northeast along the 45-degree line implies a higher poverty impact, and vice versa if 
we move southwest along this line. A total of nine projects were finally selected 
with a solicited investment of around 1.66 million dollars, slightly less than the 1.7 
million dollars allocated for the pilot program. The first eight projects selected were 
those that obtained the highest poverty score from the Principal Component analysis. 
The ninth project selected (from Guatemala) strictly obeyed the specific requirement 
that at least one project from each country be covered by the program. 
Table 7 summarizes the distribution of projects (and the amount of funds re-
quested) by country during each stage of the evaluation process: eligible, fulfilled  
Table 7. Distribution of Projects Eligible for Evaluation That Get Past the Risk Scoring and 
That Were Finally Selected by Country 
A. Eligible projects 
Country # Projects Amount (US$) 
El Salvador  4 786,623 
Guatemala  11 1,905,634 
Honduras  14 2,697,193 
Nicaragua  10 1,725,340 
    
Total  39 7,114,790 
B. Projects with a risk scoring below or equal to 67 percent 
Country # Projects Amount (US$) 
El Salvador  3 586,713 
Guatemala  6 968,946 
Honduras  10 1,958,293 
Nicaragua  5 955,448 
    
Total  24 4,469,400 
C. Selected projects 
Country # Projects Amount (US$) 
El Salvador  1 187,075 
Guatemala  1 186,700 
Honduras  5 992,927 
Nicaragua  2 299,759 
    
Total  9 1,666,461 
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the risk score requirement of 67 percent or less, and selected. As mentioned above, 
the projects are currently in the implementation phase; a posterior impact evalua-
tion of the selected projects will serve to extend the working database for risk 
scoring and to improve the scorecard system. The selected projects are intended to 
benefit nearly 6,000 people (50 percent of which are women) in areas with high 
poverty levels. 
4 Concluding Remarks 
This chapter develops a poverty-sensitive scorecard system for lending or grant 
allocation in developing markets. The proposed methodology used to evaluate 
loan or grant applications involves constructing both risk and poverty scoring to 
assure both the sustainability of the project and a high poverty impact. In the first 
stage, a risk scorecard is developed using a semi-parametric econometric model to 
assess the default probability of the potential borrowers/grantees. In a second 
stage, following a Principal Components analysis, a poverty scorecard is con-
structed to evaluate those projects (borrowers) with a risk score below a certain 
threshold in terms of their potential poverty reduction. In other words, projects 
that were proven to be sustainable in the first stage are ranked in the second stage 
in terms of their potential impact on poverty. We finally implement the scorecard 
system in a pilot program of grant competition in four countries in Central Amer-
ica to link rural smallholders to markets. 
The improvement of the proposed scorecard system over the existing method-
ology is twofold. First, the use of the latest developments in econometric modeling 
for the risk scoring allows us to improve the accuracy of risk ranking and to better 
approximate the sustainability of potential projects under evaluation. Second, by 
combining two scorecards, our proposed methodology goes beyond poverty score-
cards to prioritize lending or grant allocation. Schreiner (2010), for example, rec-
ommends a poverty-targeting approach based on identifying high poverty areas 
using household surveys to prioritize lending. Our proposed lending/grant alloca-
tion criterion goes beyond this: it ranks enterprises (projects) with a poverty reduc-
tion potential that are also proven to be sustainable. Sustainability is a necessary 
condition for poverty reduction and a relevant matter in underdeveloped countries, 
where the problem of adverse selection is acute. Ultimately, the idea is to help 
policymakers choose from loan or grant applications based on both the chances of 
project survival and the poverty reduction potential. Additionally, to the extent 
that we suggest using spatial data and relate to poverty maps, Schreiner’s pro-
posed scorecard is nested in the second stage of our scorecard. 
The proposed scorecard system should also be viewed as a dynamic process that 
can be further improved across time, particularly when there is initially limited in-
formation for risk assessment. Initial pilot programs, such as the one described in 
this chapter, could help to provide additional information (based on the performance 
evaluation of the selected projects) to extend the working database for scoring as-
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sessment and to keep improving the scorecard system. This process can continue 
until a performance history is well established for a reasonably large portfolio of 
loans/grants. In the long run, the risk scoring mechanism could operate through a 
simple, implementable program in open-source software (such as a spreadsheet). 
Future research should involve formally evaluating the effectiveness of the 
proposed scorecard system over simple poverty-based targeting and/or over stan-
dard risk-based criteria. The further application and extension of pilot programs in 
developing areas on different contexts will help to perform this exercise. 
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